Expressiveness as a Quality and as the Expression of a Fictive Subject

Krzysztof Guczalski*

Jagiellonian University Krakow

Abstract. Classic expression theory identified the emotional content of works of art with the feelings of their creators or recipients. This content thus appeared to be external to the work itself. Consequently, formalism declared it to be irrelevant to a work’s value. A solution to this dilemma — one which the Polish aesthetician Henryk Elzenberg was among the first to propose — was suggested by the idea that physical, sensual objects can themselves possess emotional qualities. Thanks to Bouwsma and Beardsley, this concept — of expressiveness as a quality — became common in Anglo-American aesthetics from the fifties onwards. At the same time, these authors demanded that the term “expression” be expunged from the language of aesthetics.

However, the widespread tendency to conceptualise the emotional content of art in terms of the expression of a certain subject (most often the artist) still requires some explanation — interpretation, rather than negation. One interpretation construes the expressiveness of works of art in terms of the expression of a fictive subject, the “work’s persona”, conceived by Elzenberg in 1950/1960. This paper discusses his concept and explains some of its more complex aspects, before addressing the emergence of a very similar concept within Anglo-American aesthetics. This concept was gradually elaborated in the seventies and eighties, but only in the nineties did it become more fully developed and widely discussed.

* Email: krzysztof.guczalski@uj.edu.pl
1. Introduction

Classic expression theory of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century identified the emotional content of works of art with the feelings of their creators or recipients. This content thus appeared to be something external to the work itself. Consequently, formalism declared it to be irrelevant to the value of a work. This was, of course, an unwelcome conclusion, since we obviously wish to discuss the emotional content of art as one of its essential elements and as relevant to its value.

2. Emotional Colouring according to Elzenberg ...

A way out of this dilemma was suggested by the idea that physical, sensual objects can themselves have certain emotional qualities, and the Polish aesthetician Henryk Elzenberg (1887—1967) was one of the first to propose this concept, in 1937, at a time when later versions of classic expression theory were being formulated in the English-language literature (e.g. Curt Ducasse, 1929, R. G. Collingwood, 1938).

In his article ‘Zabarwienie uczuciowe jako zjawisko estetyczne’ [Emotional colouring as an aesthetic phenomenon] published in 1937, Elzenberg drew attention to a way of understanding expressivity which is linked directly with the expressive object itself, e.g. with a work of art, and which tends not to be overtly present in traditional theories of expression. In order to explain and justify his notion, Elzenberg began by enumerating three phenomena that were traditionally encompassed by the notion of expressivity. The first of these is the expressing of real mental content by means of objects accessible to sensory cognition (e.g. an artist’s manifesting of his/her experience in a work) and the second is the arousing of emotional states in the receiver; classic expression theory has come to focus on these two aspects. As the third phenomenon, Elzenberg enumerates animisation; that is, ascribing a fictive psyche to inanimate objects. Thus we can say, for instance, that the sea ‘grows angry’ or that a weeping willow ‘grows sad’. This phenomenon is also considered by Elzenberg to be

---

1 Henryk Elzenberg, ‘Zabarwienie uczuciowe jako zjawisko estetyczne’ [Emotional colouring as an aesthetic phenomenon], in Manfred Kridl (ed.), Prace ofiarowane Kazimierzowi Wóycickiemu [Festschrift for Kazimierz Wóycicki] (Vilnius, 1937), pp. 483-491. In the following abbreviated as ZU.

generally perceived in contemporary aesthetic literature.

However, over and above these three, he draws attention to one further phenomenon, more mysterious — as he claims — than the others: ‘a pure, subjectless emotional “quality” inherent in an object ... which ... might also be called the emotional “colouring” of that object’ (ZU, p. 485). Elzenberg substantiates his argument that such a phenomenon does indeed occur by giving examples of expressivity which cannot be reduced to the three earlier types. When, for instance, someone says that a landscape is ‘gloomy’ or ‘cheerful’, this cannot mean, of course, that the real feelings of some animate creature are manifesting themselves in it, and it does not necessarily mean that the observer himself is overcome by such a feeling under the sway of the landscape. As Elzenberg says, ‘The divergence between our own mood and the mood of our natural surroundings was formerly such a common theme in lyrical poetry that it became almost banal’ (ZU, p. 486).

There remains animisation: the notional ascribing of a ‘gloomy’ or ‘cheerful’ psyche to a landscape. But when we use emotional terms in relation to objects not endowed with a psyche, are we always dealing with animisation, with attributing a fictive psyche to objects? When we perceive a sea as ‘angry’, do we only do so when we are inclined to say that it is ‘angered’ or that a weeping willow is ‘sad’ when it is ‘saddened’? Apparently not, and Elzenberg also declares himself ‘in favour of’ the independent existence of emotional “colouring” and against the possibility of reducing it to any sort of animisation’, arguing that ‘all animisation appears to presuppose [the prior existence of emotional “colouring”] and cannot occur at all until the observer has perceived some emotional colouring’ (ZU, p. 487). This is because animisation is never neutral and does not involve ascribing to an object a qualitatively indefinite psyche: ‘we animise not “in general”, but animise a fort or a mountain peak as “proud”, spring as “joyous”, sea on a stormy day as “angry” and so on’ (ZU, p. 488). It is only because we discern in an object certain qualities which we perceive as emotional that we are at all inclined to animise that object, that is, to ascribe to it a fictive psyche which might underlie the qualities we have already discerned. So the perceiving of these qualities must be the prior phenomenon.

Elzenberg lists several potential explanations for the origins of such emotional qualities. Among others, he speaks of an analogy with the attitudes, movements and voice inflections of a person experiencing cer-
tain feelings, thereby alluding to the classical tradition, derived from Plato (The Republic, 399a-c; Laws, 654e-655b, 669c) and in general currency during the seventeenth century. However, he reserves judgment as to the correctness of all explanations of this sort. He was clearly of the opinion that all potential explanations — including that of Plato — were far from satisfying and convincing.

3. ...and in American Aesthetics

In American aesthetics, one of the first steps in the direction of seeking the expressivity of a work of art in the work itself — and not in the experiences of the creator or the receiver — was taken by Susanne Langer (1895—1985). In her work Philosophy in a New Key,\(^2\) Langer sharply criticises the view that music’s expressivity is to be explained in terms of the expression of real feelings, experiences or other emotional states in the composer or the performer (which she calls self-expression), and that its emotional content consists in arousing certain feelings in the receiver. The emotional content of a work of music is contained in the work itself, and Langer explains the grounds for this presence as follows:

> The tonal structures we call ‘music’ bear a close logical similarity to the forms of human feeling — forms of growth and of attenuation, flowing and stowing, conflict and resolution, speed, arrest, terrific excitement, calm, or subtle activation and dreamy lapses — not joy and sorrow perhaps, but the poignancy of either and both — the greatness and brevity and eternal passing of everything vitally felt. Such is the pattern, or logical form, of sentience; and the pattern of music is that same form worked out in pure, measured sound and silence. Music is a tonal analogue of emotive life.\(^3\)

But the aestheticians usually associated with a fundamental breakthrough in thinking about the expressivity of art are Oets Kolk Bouwsma (1898—1978) and Monroe Beardsley (1915—1985). In his essay ‘The Expression


\(^{3}\) This quotation comes from a later book by Susanne Langer (Feeling and Form., New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1953, p. 27), in which she recapitulates the main theses on music presented in Philosophy in a New Key.
Theory of Art’,4 from 1950, Bouwsma arrives at the conclusion that the typical models which were normally used to explain the phenomenon of expressivity in art, namely the model of expressing emotions and the model of expressing in language, let us down and lead to misunderstandings.5 He proposes, therefore, abandoning those analogies and accepting that what we usually call the expressivity of works of art amounts simply to certain properties belonging to those works themselves:

...now, unabashed, we shall say that the music is sad, and we shall not go on to say that this means that the music expresses sadness. For the sadness is to the music rather like the redness to the apple, than it is like burp to the cider. And above all we shall not, having heard the music or read the poem, ask, ‘What does it express?’6

But why do we use emotional categories at all to denominate these properties? To this question, Bouwsma gives the standard answer, familiar from Plato’s times, which Elzenberg clearly considers insufficient: ‘Sad music has some of the characteristics of people who are sad. It will be slow, not tripping: it will be low, not tinkling. People who are sad move more slowly, and when they speak, they speak softly and low.’7

A similar stance was adopted by the much better known and influential American aesthetician Monroe Beardsley, in 1958:

The Expression Theory has called our attention to an important fact about music — namely, that it has human regional qualities [elsewhere Beardsley also speaks of feeling qualities — K.G.]. But in performing this service it has rendered itself obsolete. We now have no further use for it. Indeed we are much better off without it. ‘The music is joyous’ is plain and can be defended. ‘The music expresses joy’ adds nothing except unnecessary and unanswerable questions.

5 However, the argument that the expression of emotions is not a good model for expression in art — an argument presented in just a few sentences (first paragraph on p. 87) — is itself disappointing and is certainly much less convincing than in Langer.
For ‘express’ is properly a relational term; it requires an X that does
the expressing and a Y that is expressed, and X and Y must be dis-
tinct. When we say that a rose is red, we have only one thing, namely
the rose, and we describe its quality; in exactly the same way, when
we say the music is joyous, we have only one thing, namely the music,
and we describe its quality. There is no need for the term ‘express’.  

As we can see, Bouwsma and Beardsley adopt the opposite pole from clas-
sic expression theory: whilst the latter interpreted the emotional content
of art as the expression of its creator’s feelings, that is, something external
to the art itself, Bouwsma and Beardsley, focussing on the properties of the
work itself, completely dissociate themselves from such a model and from
any sort of link between the expressivity of art and the human expression
of emotions.

This is particularly odd in the context of Bouwsma’s explanation of the
reasons why we are inclined to call music ‘sad’ (and Beardsley’s opinion in
this matter is similar). His explanation points precisely to a similarity with
the natural expression of emotions, and not to some other qualities not
connected with the expression of emotions. He should admit, therefore,
that even if ‘sad’ music is not simply an expression of someone’s emotions,
it is at least something ‘expression-like’ or quasi-expressive.

Moreover, even if we agree that emotional content in art is above all
a question of certain qualities of the work itself, the widespread tendency
to perceive and understand them as the expression of some subject (most
commonly the creator) calls for some explanation — interpretation rather
than negation. An interpretation which at the same time would not violate
— of which some versions of classic expression theory may be accused —
the equally common conviction of the autonomy and inherent value of the
works of art themselves, which are, after all, not reducible to merely the
means of acquainting ourselves with the mental content of their creators.

4. A Return towards Expressivity as Expression

This intuition was followed once again by Elzenberg, who in the later arti-
cle ‘Ekspresja pozaestetyczna i estetyczna’ [Aesthetic and extra-aesthetic

---

expression], written in 1950, words his initial problem as follows: how can we understand, in the domain of aesthetics, expression ‘in the proper sense’, that is, ‘the manifestation through certain objects perceptible to the senses ... of certain “content” ... of a mental nature belonging to some being that is indeed endowed with a psyche’ (EPE, p. 49). Taking this question as his point of departure, around the time when Bouwsma and Beardsley were publishing their theories completely renouncing the language of expression in aesthetics, he elaborated a conception that somehow reconciled the two different points of view: expressivity as a property and expressivity as the creator’s expression.

To begin with, Elzenberg observes that many instances of expression in the proper sense are not of an aesthetic character. His examples include tears on a book indicating the emotions felt by the reader or a crumpled and torn tissue in the corner of a settee, testifying the anxiousness of its owner. In this connection, he poses the question as to what distinguishes aesthetic from anaesthetic expression. The argumentation he follows, leads him to the following condition that expression must fulfil in order to be considered aesthetic: ‘the image of mental content must be given not by means of its symptom, but together with it, directly, such that image and symptom might be grasped together in a single act of perception’ (EPE, p. 53). And to illustrate his idea he gives a very vivid comparison:

...mental content must be given in — or on — the manifestation in more or less the same way as moisture in a sponge, a scent in the air, a sheen on snow or poetry in a sonnet; perhaps more bluntly, like wetness in water or greenness on a leaf. ... This content, to put it slightly less vividly, must be simply read by the observer from the manifestation. Or completely drily: the observer must find it on the

---

9 Henryk Elzenberg, ‘Ekspresja pozaestetyczna i estetyczna’ [Aesthetic and extra-aesthetic expression], Estetyka, 1 (1960), pp. 49-65. In the following abbreviated as EPE. Although Elzenberg’s article was published in 1960, according to a footnote it was written in 1950. In this case, the lengthy period between writing and publication was due to historical and political factors. In Poland, the years 1950-56 brought the most austere Stalinist totalitarianism. Elzenberg, along with other philosophers who failed to express their accession to the only ‘right’ philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, was relieved of his teaching duties during that time, and so the publication of works of any kind was also obviously out of the question.
manifestation. In short, this may be called the *immanence* of the mental object in the manifestation ... (EPE, p. 55)

The parallel between this formulation and Bouwsma’s ‘redness of an apple’ or Beardsley’s ‘redness of a rose’ is, of course, quite patent.

So the mental content conveyed in aesthetic expression must consist of those mental qualities of the expressive object which are familiar from Elzenberg’s earlier article. Therefore, whilst in that earlier article Elzenberg argued that something like emotional colouring belonging to objects that are perceptible to the senses does exist, now he is showing that it is essentially the heart of expression in its aesthetic variety. Or to put it another way: it is the necessary condition of the aestheticism of expression.

Of course, this conclusion concords with the stance of Bouwsma and Beardsley. However, in discerning qualities of this sort, they came to the conclusion that speaking about expression in relation to art was superfluous and would even lead to notional confusion and misunderstanding. So how does Elzenberg avoid this sort of reductionistic conclusion and make good on his promise to find an aesthetic variety of expression in the proper sense?

***

Of course, Elzenberg agrees that the first, most fundamental and also, as he puts it, ‘aesthetically purest’ variety of the perception of emotional content in art is the perception of certain emotional qualities in a work of art. He observes, however, that quite often our perception does not remain exclusively on this level of purely qualitative reception.

...a mental quality, once it has occurred on an object, insistently demands that we make, compose or dream up some psyche for it, in which it could ‘settle’. And ... before the observer knows it, he sees the qualities almost automatically pulling that psyche into the heart of the object with them. There follows ... what on this occasion we denote with the now classic and established term *animisation*: attributing a psyche to things not endowed with one. Of course, this psyche is not neutral; it obtains exactly those experiences and dispositions which correspond to the qualities perceived [in the object] ... (EPE, p. 60)
This is how we animise, in particular, many natural objects: ‘mountains and rivers, a gale and the night’. And the psyche ascribed to them is, for obvious reasons, ‘wholly unambiguously fictive’ (EPE, p. 61).

However, Elzenberg also points to one further type of reception, one further variety of our attitude towards objects characterised by emotional qualities, which is like the next stage in animisation and concerns only such objects as are somehow associated with an actual human psyche; that is, human artefacts. Objects of this kind — in particular works of art — may, of course, be animised in the same way as natural objects: ‘it is not Beethoven who at a given moment relinquishes his internal struggles and falls into an ecstasy of joy, but ... the Ninth Symphony itself, the very content-laden sound mass’ (EPE, p. 62). In this case, there are two psyches associated with the object: the fictive, dreamed-up psyche of the Ninth Symphony, filled with exactly that content which we discerned as emotional colouring in the object itself. This is, therefore, the ‘immanent psyche of an aesthetic object’. And then there is the real psyche of the composer, transcending the aesthetic object, and linked to it only genetically. This real psyche does not fictively belong to the aesthetic object, but actually belongs to some real human being — in this instance Beethoven. In this situation, there occurs, however, a natural tendency to identify these two psyches with one another:

...somehow, the psyche which we attributed to the object in the process of animisation we now identify with the psyche of an actual human being, with whom the object stands in a factual relationship; we lose the sense of difference so thoroughly that we no longer see two psyches, the fictive and the real, in our field of vision, but only one: at once of both the object and the person. However, it soon turns out that this is not identification on equal terms: the real human psyche is stronger than the imaginary, fragile mental life of the object and consequently has a tendency to oust it from our awareness. And ultimately that which was identification may even become the substitution of the human psyche for the psyche of the object: now it is no longer the actual symphony that rejoices or breaks down, but within it, embodied in it, as it were, that someone who shaped it that way. And the same applies in other cases: it is not through the object, but in the object itself, as its content, that the person manifests himself. (EPE, p. 63)
One might go so far as to surmise that these two psyches often do not even appear as separate in the awareness of the receiver, but rather from the start as a composite, which Elzenberg defines as the outcome of the process of identification, that is, as a conglomerate of the two: as a psyche which we call by the creator’s name (and which we imagine to be his/her psyche) but which possesses qualitative endowments that are wholly derived from the emotional colouring of the work itself. Thus the work, in a tautological way, becomes an adequate image and expression of that psyche — just as in ordinary animisation. Unlike in ordinary animisation, however, the expressed psyche is understood as the real psyche of the composer and not as the unequivocally fictive psyche of the work. It is not the sea or the Ninth Symphony that ‘grows angry’, but ‘Beethoven’ himself embodied in it.

Since the mental content which is manifest in the work belongs, at least notionally, to a certain being who is indeed endowed with a psyche (i.e. the composer) (and not, as in ordinary animisation, to an object which is not actually endowed with a psyche and only ‘possesses’ one in an unequivocally fictive way), we may conclude that we are dealing with an instance of expression in the proper sense. Yet because at the same time this content is directly present in the work of art as its emotional qualities, we may regard this expression as aesthetic:

And that is just how expression in the proper sense, in its aesthetic variety, would look; or, perhaps more in keeping with the actual state of affairs, this is what that expression, in order to be aesthetic, must transform itself into. (EPE, p. 64)

Which means that this is not, literally speaking, expression in the proper sense. In truth, the mental content which is manifest in this expression does not belong to some real psyche; we only imagine that it does. In other words, we ascribe the mental content derived from the work itself to a certain imagined human subject, whom we most often imaginatively identify with the work’s creator. Thus the perception of a work as the expression of its creator is only an elaborate rhetorical figure, even if we are sometimes not fully aware of its figurative character. It would seem, therefore, that in this case we understand expressivity as the expression of a fictive human subject.
5. Conclusion

Elzenberg’s conception appears to render justice to the strong and generalised tendency to understand art as expression — something which cannot be said of the contemporary conceptions of Bouwsma and Beardsley, which consign expression quite one-sidedly to banishment from the language of aesthetics. At the same time, Elzenberg’s interpretation does not undermine another powerful conviction, that of the autonomy of the work of art (after all, the ‘artist’s psyche’ is derived entirely from the work) — an accusation that could have been levelled at classic expression theory from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Unfortunately, Elzenberg’s work was apparently not translated into English, and consequently Anglo-Saxon aesthetics found itself under the overwhelming influence of the one-sided stance of Bouwsma and Beardsley. When this stance eventually triggered an oppositional reaction, aimed at rehabilitating the widespread use of the term ‘expression’ in relation to art, Anglo-Saxon aestheticians spent the next forty years or so elaborating a multi-dimensional and well-balanced conception similar to that devised by Elzenberg.

On one hand, there arose more detailed conceptions in relation to particular artistic disciplines, which — although, like the conceptions of Bouwsma and Beardsley, placing the emphasis on the interpretation of emotional content as properties, with the intention of correcting the faults of classic expression theory — did not renounce completely their link with expression and the use of that term. They merely proposed speaking of expressivity and not of real expression (in the proper sense). Typical examples are the music-related conceptions of Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies,\(^\text{10}\) from the eighties and nineties. The latter, for example, speaks of ‘emotion characteristics in appearances’ in a very similar way to that in which Elzenberg speaks of emotional qualities or colouring in sensual objects.

On the other hand, there also appeared attempts to rehabilitate the term ‘expression’ in its original, proper sense. One of the first such at-

tempts, rather unsuccessful and not particularly convincing, referring solely to the fine arts, dates from 1965. In relation to music (although primarily to music with words), a conception of the expression of a fictive subject was first proposed — as Jerrold Levinson states — in 1974, by Edward T. Cone. In 1982, music in general, not necessarily connected with a text, was considered by Donald Callen, who notes that expressivity may be understood not only as the presence of some or other qualities of a certain impersonal object (an acoustic product), but also as the fictive expression of someone’s emotional states. We find similar suggestions made in 1985 by Jenefer Robinson, in relation to literature, and in 1986 by Bruce Vermazen, in relation to art in general. Not until the nineties did the conception of the expression of a fictive subject become more widely disseminated and discussed. The most mature, comprehensive and persuasive version of this conception — in essence the closest to that of Elzenberg — is the theory put forward in 1995 by Aaron Ridley (the only British scholar among this group), again formulated in relation to music. Like Elzenberg, Ridley sees the construct of a fictive subject (called a ‘persona’ in this conception) as only one of the possible ways of perceiving music. But the following year

17 For the sake of form, it should be mentioned that since then Ridley seems to have abandoned his insightful and cogent theory. In his paper ‘Expression in Art’ in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 211–227, Ridley argues for a return to a version of classic expression theory, according to which there is no essential difference between artistic and ordinary expression. However impressive they may be, Ridley’s arguments in this paper seem rather confused and misconceived, and they are ultimately unconvincing.
(1996), there appeared another work, Jerrold Levinson’s ‘Musical Expressiveness’, burdened — as in Bouwsma and Beardsley — with the typical overstatement of a single model. Levinson’s work includes the suggestion that the construction (notion) of a fictive subject appears on every occasion that we hear music as expressive, that the expressivity of music is simply (always!) hearing it as the expression of a fictive subject.18 So this is the opposite pole to that found in Bouwsma and Beardsley. In turn, dissatisfaction with such a one-dimensional view helped to inspire recent articles by Robert Stecker19 and Saam Trivedi,20 who state — correctly, of course — that when receiving music as expressive, we by no means always imagine a fictive person being the subject of that expression. And, seeking an alternative conception, Trivedi makes the ‘discovery’ that another, frequent, way of perceiving the expressivity of music is... the animisation of the music itself. ‘Discovery’ in inverted commas, since animisation, as we remember from Elzenberg’s first article, was already a widely known and accepted phenomenon in aesthetic literature in the thirties.

Against this background, Elzenberg’s theory, comprehensive, multi-dimensional and well-balanced as it is, still — half a century after its publication — stands out as exceptionally perceptive. It anticipates, in the highly succinct form of an article of less than twenty pages, and at the same time ‘summarises’ half a century of the development of English-language conceptions of expressivity.