Art for Life’s Sake: Iris Murdoch on the Relationship Between Art and Morality

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Abstract. This paper explores the relationship between art and morality from British philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch’s distinctive approach to ethics. Murdoch defends the close connection between art and morality, beauty and goodness, and aesthetics and ethics by focusing on the role of art in moral life, and in particular on the analogy between the aesthetic experience in creating and enjoying art and the moral experience. The paper elaborates on Murdoch’s argument for the vital and intrinsic connection between art and morality in terms of two main themes. First, art reveals the reality of the human condition and in turn enhances our moral perception of what is real and cultivates the virtue of loving attention to others. In this light, art and morality are one in that the essence of both is love, which is the true vision of individuals. Second, in cultivating the true vision, art does not simply serve as an aid for morality, but is a spiritual exercise in purifying our psychic energy by redirecting our attention in the search for the good. This assertion leads to the second level of inquiry of this paper, which examines Murdoch’s thesis of salvation through art in the modern secular world.

1. Introduction

The relationship between art and morality, which dates back at least to Plato’s quarrel between poetry and philosophy, has been debated in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy of art, and ethics. Both a philosopher and prolific literary artist, Iris Murdoch’s (1919-1999) achievements exemplify
her argument for the unity of art and ethics. Recent research on the ethical criticism of art often references Murdoch's novels, literary theory, moral philosophy, and theological beliefs (Carroll, 2000; Dean, 2002; Eskin, 2004; Kieran, 1996; Rowe and Horner, 2010).

To broaden and deepen understanding of the complexity and variety of moral experience, Murdoch sees ethics and moral life as a form of aesthetics. Her ethics emphasizes the perception (aisthesis, the Greek origin of “aesthetics”) to discern the moral features of particular situations and expands the ethical domain in terms of aesthetic perception and experience.¹ But this is not an instrumentalist account of the relationship between art and morals and aesthetics and ethics. In her article, The Sublime and the Good, Murdoch construes an internal relationship between art and morals by asserting that “art is for life’s sake... or else it is worthless” (Murdoch, 1997, 218).² However, her art-for-life’s-sake view of art does not state that art is didactic or educational. Art functions at a deeper level. The experience of art is itself a spiritual pilgrimage of soul from selfish fantasy to a clear vision of reality. For Murdoch, art enriches moral understanding, cultivates virtue, and helps us to achieve better lives.

This paper explores the relationship between art and morality from Murdoch's distinctive approach to ethics. My contention is that Murdoch defends the close connection between art and morality, beauty and goodness, and consequently, between aesthetics and ethics by focusing on the role of art in moral life, and in particular on the analogy between the aesthetic experience in creating and enjoying art and the moral experience. I shall begin by elaborating on Murdoch's argument for the vital and intrinsic connection between art and morality in terms of two main themes. First, art reveals the reality of the human condition and in turn enhances our moral perception of what is real and cultivates the virtue of loving attention to others. In this light, art and morals are one in that the essence

¹ Jeffrey Dean (2002) offers a comprehensive list of contemporary philosophers who stress the close connection between aesthetic and moral perception and understanding, including Wayne Booth, Noel Carroll, Gregory Currie, Richard Eldridge, Susan Feagin, Peter Lamarque, Peter McCormick, Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum, Frank Palmer, John Passmore, and Hilary Putnam. Matthew Kieran, who Dean does not include, in my view, also shares this position.
² Cited hereafter as EM.
of both is love, which is the true vision of individuals. Second, in cultivating the true vision, art does not simply serve as an aid for morality, but is a spiritual exercise in purifying our psychic energy by redirecting our attention in the search for the good. Being the pilgrimage from appearance to reality, art is the “progressive redemption of desire” (Murdoch, 1992, 25) which is the essence of moral growth. This assertion leads to the second level of inquiry of this paper, which examines Murdoch’s thesis of salvation through art in the modern secular world.

2. Connecting Art to Morality

(i) Art as the Perception of Individuals

Murdoch depicts the relationships between art, morality, and ethics in different terms. She argues that “art is the clue” (Murdoch, 1970, 62, emphasis mine); “when we use the nature of art as a clue, we may be able to learn more about the central area of morality” (SG, 86, emphasis mine); and that “ethics and aesthetics are not one, but art is the great clue to morals” (EM, 202). At times she states that “art and morals [are] two aspects of a single struggle” (SG, 39-40) and that “art is an excellent analogy of morals, or indeed that it is in this respect a case of morals” (SG, 58, emphasis mine). Her strongest assertion is that art and morals are one in that they share the same essence, which is love: “Art and morals are, with certain provisos... one. Their essence is the same” (EM, 215, emphasis mine). In addition, Murdoch describes her work as “identifying art and morals” (EM, 218, emphasis mine). All these statements involve, I will argue, the ideal of art and morality to attend to a reality other than oneself.

Murdoch’s distinctive ethical theory emphasizes the moral agent’s inner life, including one’s perception, feeling, and imagination. Morality does not reside merely in making right choices and decisions, but involves a way of seeing and responding to the complex real world. Hence, moral life is a continuous learning process, broadening and clarifying our vision of the world. Therefore, not only the willed choice and action but the quality of our vision, feeling and imagining are morally significant. As Hauerwas
correctly states, ethics is “best understood as a form of aesthetics” (1981, 2) and “the moral life is thus better understood on the analogy of the aesthetic mode of seeing and beholding than in terms of action and decision. For the right answer is mainly a matter of really looking” (1981, 37).

Based on Murdoch’s vision-centered ethics, clarity of perception is morally significant because it enables loving respect for others. Her moral psychology that draws on Freud and Plato supposes that human beings are naturally egocentric and drawn to the self-serving fantasy that consoles the ego. This falsifying veil of egoism partially conceals the world and prevents us from seeing the real world (SG, 57). Hence, the core of moral task is to break through this veil and to see the world as it really is. To overcome the selfish fantasy and achieve clear vision, the exercise of “attention” is required. Attention is a concept that Murdoch adopted from Simone Weil and is used to express “the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality...and the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent” (SG, 33).

According to Murdoch, certain téchne, such as the sciences, crafts, intellectual disciplines and art, can help us focus our attention away from the selfish ego towards the real and the good, because they can “stretch the imagination, enlarge the vision and strengthen the judgment” (SG, 87-88).

In intellectual disciplines and in the enjoyment of art and nature we discover value in our ability to forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly. We use our imagination not to escape the world but to join it, and this exhilarates us because of the distance between our ordinary dulled consciousness and an apprehension of the real. (SG, 88)

For Murdoch, art—more than an analogy to morals—may be considered a rich form of moral activity in which we attempt to see the individual more clearly. This is attributed to several reasons. First, compared to abstract and discursive philosophical reflection, art, in particular painting and literature, reveals the contingent tangled details of human lives in rich particularity (SG, 33; 94). “Art is informative and entertaining, it condenses and clarifies the world, directing attention upon particular things... Art illuminates accident and contingency and the general muddle of life, the limitations of time and the discursive intellect, so as to enable us to survey
complex or horrible things which would otherwise appal us” (MM, 8). And it is the particular individual that matters to morality.

Second, art deepens our imaginative understanding of the world and fosters our moral sensibility and sensitivity. According to Murdoch, perception is not only a passive receptive faculty. Rather than perceiving an objective given reality, the agent’s “constructive activity of imagination and attention ‘introduces’ value into the world which we confront” (EM, 201). Murdoch contrasts the concepts of imagination and fantasy in several statements: “a distinction between egoistic fantasy and liberated truth-seeking creative imagination;” “fantasy as mechanical, egoistic, untruthful, and ‘imagination’ as truthful and free;” and “two active faculties, one somewhat mechanically generating narrowly banal false pictures (the ego as all-powerful), and the other freely and creatively exploring the world, moving towards the expression and elucidation...of what is true and deep” (MM, 321). While fantasy is per definitionem an activity which obscures our perception with false self-consoling pictures, imagination is “a restoration of freedom, cognition, the effortful ability to see what lies before one more clearly, more justly, to consider new possibility, and to respond to good attachments and desires which have been in eclipse” (MM, 322). Imagination enables us to shift our perspectives and put ourselves in others’ place and be more sympathetic and empathetic with others.

According to Kieran, although Murdoch correctly claims that “art enables us to better understand moral reality,” her presumptions of moral particularism undermine the close link between art and morality and make her argument unattractive. Kieran also asserts that “[Murdoch’s] mistake is to presume that therefore moral learning and justification per se makes no significant recourse to principle at all” (1996, 341). Kieran’s criticism is inadequate because he neglects Murdoch’s later thoughts in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Murdoch does not dispense with the concept of duty: “the concept of duty as moral rules of a certain degree of generality should stay in place” (MM, 302). See also (MM, 294; 303; 381) and Antonaccio (2001, 323).

Murdoch illustrates this point with the advice: “Be more sympathetic, imagine her situation, see it from her point of view” (MM, 322). This can be compared to the Confucian concept and principle of shu (礼) and “heart or mind” (仁心) and is often translated as altruistic attitude, consideration, and putting yourself in another’s place. The principle of shu operates on the power of imagination or the ability to shift perspectives and encourages considerate actions towards others.

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and consumer’s efforts of “composing and holding a difficult work of art in one’s attention,” the close connection between art and morality is reinforced “teaching art is teaching morals” (MM, 322).

Third, art—more specifically, great art—enables us to see the reality as it is by enhancing our perception of what is real. This cultivates the virtue of loving attention to others. By insisting that art is more than an analogy of morality, Murdoch analyzes how the aesthetic attitude connects with the aesthetic experience and argues that moral experience calls for a similar attitude towards other people.

It is important too that great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. This exercise of detachment is difficult and valuable whether the thing contemplated is a human being or the root of a tree or the vibration of a colour or a sound. Unsentimental contemplation of nature exhibits the same quality of detachment: selfish concerns vanish, nothing exists except the things which are seen. Beauty is that which attracts this particular sort of unselfish attention. It is obvious here what is the role, for the artist or spectator, of exactness and objective vision: unsentimental, detached, unselfish objective attention. It is also clear that in moral situations a similar exactness is called for. (SG, 64)

In art and aesthetic experience both the artist and perceiver are undergoing the process of detachment, defined by Murdoch as suppressing selfish fantasy and seeing the reality of others in its own right. Great art, which involves “liberated truth-seeking creative imagination” rather than “egoistic fantasy” (MM, 321), fosters our aesthetic perception by revealing the real world and enables us to see “what is deeply and obviously true, but usually invisible” (MM, 90). The disciplined aesthetic perception, namely, the unselfish loving attention, is also required in daily moral situations. The true vision of reality is exactly the essence of the Murdochian love and virtue.

Murdoch does not use the term aesthetic attitude in her text; it occurs once in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (MM, 301), but in a different context; nevertheless, her discussions include the concept of aesthetic attitude, as found in contemporary aesthetics literature. For the sake of brevity, the dispute raised by George Dickie regarding Stolnitz’ and Beardsley’s accounts of aesthetic attitude and experience is not discussed here.
If, still led by the clue of art, we ask further questions about the faculty which is supposed to relate us to what is real and thus bring us to what is good, the idea of compassion or love will be naturally suggested. It is not simply that suppression of the self is required before accurate vision can be obtained. The great artist sees his objects... in a light of justice and mercy. The direction of attention is, contrary to nature, outward, away from self which reduces all to a false unity, towards the great surprising variety of the world, and the ability so to direct attention is love... It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists. (SG, 64-65)

Artistic and aesthetic experience enhances our capacity for loving attention, which Murdoch sees as the discipline required by both art and morals. True perception of individuals inspires respect for others. “Aesthetic insight connects with moral insight, respect for things, connects with respect for persons” (MM, 495). This is the basis of Murdoch’s argument for the unity of art and morality:

Art and morals are, with certain provisos..., one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality. (EM, 215)

(ii) Art as Spiritual Exercise

The key reason Murdoch provides for the close connection between art and morality is art’s teaching role in enhancing moral perception. Art provides us an experience of how the clear vision and love are achieved. For Murdoch, the “unsentimental, detached, unselfish objective attention” (SG, 64) required in art, both for the artist and consumer, is moral training for the virtue of loving attention to others. Moreover, in cultivating the true vision of reality, art does not simply serve as an aid for morality, but is itself a spiritual exercise in purifying our psychic energy while redirecting our attention. In Murdoch’s view, art not only enriches our moral understanding but also makes us better. The role of art in moral life is thus not limited to a utilitarian, didactic, or educational function to cultivate our moral sensibility. An achievement through art is morally good in itself, as Murdoch states:
To say that the essence of art is love is not to say, is nothing to do with saying, that art is didactic or educational. It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental. The level at which that love works which is art is deeper than the level at which we deliberate concerning improvement. (EM, 218)

As is well known, Murdoch is profoundly influenced by Plato. In her moral psychology, clarity of vision is connected with the quality of consciousness and thus, she regards the “attempted purification of consciousness as the central and fundamental ‘arena’ of morality... My moral energy is a function of how I understand, see, the world” (MM, 293). She uses Plato’s allegory of the cave to portray the agent’s moral growth as a spiritual pilgrimage from appearance to reality, which is simultaneously a slow transformation of the fundamental energy of consciousness from “low Eros” to “high Eros”.

Plato uses this concept of energy to explain the nature of moral change... He essentially accompanies the image of energy (magnetic attraction) by that of light and vision. The sun gives warmth and vital force, and also the light by which to see. We must transform base egoistic energy and vision (low Eros) into high spiritual energy and vision (high Eros). (MM, 24)

According to Murdoch, enhancing the quality of consciousness involves redirecting attention away from the self towards others, which is the exercise of “unselfing”. The most obvious thing in our surrounding to achieve unselfing is beauty:

Following a hint in Plato (Phaedrus, 250) I shall start by speaking of what is perhaps the most obvious thing in our surroundings which is an occasion for “unselfing”, and that is what is popularly called beauty... Beauty is the convenient and traditional name of something which art and nature share, and which gives a fairly clear sense to the idea of quality of experience and change of consciousness. (SG, 82)

The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its difficulties) the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. (SG, 63)
Beauty is what attracts an unselfish contemplation, be it for objects of art, nature, or human beings. For Murdoch, as Plato told us, “beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love immediately by nature” and the beautiful can act as an introduction to the good “so that aesthetic situations are not so much analogies of morals as cases of morals” (SG, 40). In the ensuing sentence, she further claims that “virtue is au fond the same in the artist as in the good man in that it is a selfless attention to nature” (SG, 40). These passages “should not be taken to mean that in promoting the ethical project of unselfing, art is serving a purpose outside itself” (Antonaccio, 2007, 92); rather, they reaffirm the contention that art and morals are internally related in the sense that art is itself an instance of moral conduct. Murdoch’s art-for-life’s-sake view of art is not tantamount to an instrumental justification for art for its educational benefit to moral development. The experience of art is itself a spiritual experience in unselfing, which occasions a pilgrimage of soul from selfish fantasy to a clear vision of reality.

Along this line of argument, while Plato banishes art and artists from his ideal republic, Murdoch attempts to save them and claims that great art offers the path to the good and that it is the artist, rather than philosopher, who can proceed from “the fire” to “the sun”. The following passage shows that Murdoch’s strategy to defend art is to distinguish good art from bad art and to contend that good art, functioning in the same way as Platonic beauty, can inspire the best part of the soul:

A great deal of art, perhaps most art, actually is self-consoling fantasy, and even great art cannot guarantee the quality of its consumer’s consciousness. However, great art exists and is sometimes properly experienced and even a shallow experience of what is great can have its effect. Art, and by ‘art’ from now on I mean good art, not fantasy art, affords us a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and its enjoyment it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession. It invigorates our best faculties and, to use Platonic language, inspires love in the highest part of the soul. It is able to do this partly by virtue of something which it shares

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8 Murdoch offers a creative reinterpretation of Plato’s views on art and beauty and attempts to defend art in The Fire and the Sun. The constraints of this paper prevent a full discussion of her arguments.
Art is thus understood as a spiritual exercise in struggling against the natural tendency to be consoled by fantasy and achieving the truthful vision of the real. The greatest art is required to be impersonal and a great artist must “silence and expel self” (SG, 63).† Given the connection between vision and psychic energy, art as the pilgrimage from appearance to reality is itself the “progressive redemption of desire” (MM, 25), which is the essence of moral growth.

3. Salvation through Art

As discussed in the last section, art cultivates our loving attention and is itself a spiritual exercise in unselfing by redirecting psychic energy away from the self towards reality. In arguing for the unity of art and morality, Murdoch suggests that art is the most important way to the salvation of soul: “For both the collective and the individual salvation of the human race, art is doubtless more important than philosophy, and literature most important of all” (SG, 74). This high praise for art reaffirms Murdoch’s belief in the essential role of art for spiritual growth. In the remainder of this paper I will examine Murdoch’s thesis of salvation through art in the modern secular world.

In her lifelong pursuit of ethics, Murdoch seeks to propose a new approach to understand morality and to answer the Socratic question: what kind of life should one lead? For her, the most important questions facing moral philosophy are: “What is a good man like? How can we make ourselves morally better? Can we make ourselves morally better?” These questions are primarily concerned with “the salvation of the individual” (MM, 24). According to Rowe, by “salvation” Murdoch does not mean

† This is also emphasized by the passage: “Rilke said of Cézanne that he did not paint ‘I like it’, he painted ‘There it is.’ This is not easy, and requires, in art or morals, a discipline. One might say here that art is an excellent analogy of morals, or indeed that it is in this respect a case of morals. We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of something else, a natural object, a person in need” (SG, 57-58).
“anything like the Christian sense of the promise of life after death,” but “simply the slow progression towards a state where one perceives reality stripped of the distorting veil of inner fantasy which destroys the moral sense” and hence acts more honestly and morally (2002, 9-10; 155, n.2). This peculiar understanding of human salvation is closely related to the fundamental assumptions underlying her thought. First, “human beings are naturally selfish and that human life has no external point or τέλος” (SG, 76). Second, “we are what we seem to be, transient moral creatures subject to necessity and chance. This is to say that there is... no God in the traditional sense of that term” (SG, 77). The uniqueness of Murdoch’s moral philosophy is that, on the one hand, she accepts the pointlessness of human existence in a secularized world where God no longer exists; on the other hand she insists on the reality of transcendent Good, against which all beings are valued and understood. Of greater interest is her attempt to connect goodness and transcendence, not to an otherworldly ideal, but to the virtue of unselfing, that is, the effort to pierce the selfish veil and join the world as it really is:¹⁰

Good is still somewhere beyond. The self, the place where we live, is a place of illusion. Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to respond to the real world in the light of a virtuous consciousness. This is the non-metaphysical meaning of the idea of transcendence to which philosophers have so constantly resorted in their explanations of goodness. ‘Good is a transcendent reality’ means that virtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is. (SG, 91)

Given the assumption of the contingency and pointlessness of human existence, Murdoch redefines virtue as overcoming the inflated ego and casting a just and loving attention to the reality of others. Moreover, the

¹⁰ Conradi’s interpretation is that: “What awaits the moral pilgrim for Murdoch is not some attenuated elsewhere, but ‘here’ differently and freshly perceived” (1986, 86). “Like another recent Platonist, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Murdoch takes the Platonic myths not as an ecstasy that transports us to another world, but as ironic counter-images of the process by which we attain a more accurate perception of this one. Love and its purification provide one means to this end: the other—as for all Neoplatonists—is of course art. Love and art are paths towards the Good, which is to say that they may provide a means towards un-selfing” (1994, 336).
attempt to be virtuous is without reward, neither hedonia nor eudaimonia. For Murdoch, art reveals both the pointlessness of virtue and its supreme importance by showing the chancy and transient human condition, although bad or mediocre art can offer false consolation and patterns. Therefore, art “is the most educational of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen” (SG, 85) and “the great artist, while showing us what is not saved, implicitly shows us what salvation means” (EM, 456).

4. Concluding Remarks

I have reconstructed Murdoch’s argument for the vital and intrinsic connection between art and morality in terms of two main themes. The first is based on the educational role of art to cultivate moral perception and the virtue of loving attention to others. The second—by assuming a connection between vision and psychic energy—is that art, as the most important path to a true vision of reality, is itself a spiritual exercise in purifying our psychic energy “in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism” (SG, 47). Great art, as well as love, help us to see the unself and to see and respond to the world as it really is, thus enabling human salvation from the self-consoling fantasy in a Murdochian godless and pointless world. Therefore, the role of art in moral life is not limited to a utilitarian, didactic, or educational function of enhancing moral understanding; rather, it is of intrinsic moral value. As Widdows (2005, 132) claims, “in a secular age, art may be the last repository of the spiritual (or at least the easiest to gain access to)... Art, for Murdoch, continues to offer access to the spiritual in a predominantly secular society.”

Some questions remain open for further inquiry and critique. First, Murdoch contends that the chief enemy of art and morals is the falsifying fantasy conjured up by “the fat relentless ego” and that the cure for egoism depends on the redirection of its energy away from selfish fantasy towards reality. However, attending to the reality of others does not imply the loss of the ego and seeing oneself as nothing does not necessarily enable “seeing other things as they really are” (SG, 101). Besides, according to Murdoch, great art transcends selfish and obsessive limitations of personality and enlarges the sensibility of its consumer. Aesthetic perception leads to a true
vision of others that arouses our love for others. Some critics, however, doubt this assertion:

...“true vision”...“occasions right conduct”. But it seems to me psychologically doubtful that “true vision” inevitably yields “right conduct”. Of course, one may define “True vision of another” to mean “loving another”, and define that in turn to mean something that would not allow behaving immorally toward the other. But then it is no longer clear at all that “successful attention” is the opposite of “inability to see reality”. Because we may be able to see the reality of some other person, in the usual sense of those words, and still not love them, in the sense Miss Murdoch would be attaching to the notion.” (Griffin, 1972, 78)

Murdoch anticipates this objection and replies to it “by appeals to experience. The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized, and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing” (SG, 64). Griffin’s objection concerns a complex question on the relationship between seeing and responding and knowledge and action, and I think Griffin may not really understand the core of Murdoch’s moral thought. For her, the quality of moral vision is closely connected with psychic energy and therefore, enhancing the capacity to see and purifying desire are never two separate achievements but one process involving both “perceptual” and “affective” responses.

Third, Murdoch defends the value of art by arguing that art has an educational role in enhancing moral perception, namely, the unselfish loving attention, but it is very tempting to wonder whether the selfless artistic vision that Murdoch describes is really required or desired in moral life.Moreover, an aesthetic regard for others does not imply moral acknowledgment, because it is possible to adopt an aesthetic attitude towards a person without respect. In reality, if a good artist sees objects in a light of justice and compassion, this does not require that he or she is morally virtuous. An excellent artist is not necessarily a virtuous moral agent and a virtuous person is not necessarily an artistically fine perceiver. To address this doubt, Murdoch must either claim that a morally deficient person is unlikely to be a good artist or that “good artists can be bad men” (EM, 460).
However, for the former, her definition of art and artist appears too narrow, highly controversial, and incongruous with contemporary aesthetic theories (Widdows, 2005, 136) and her list of great art and artists may be quite short. For the latter, her contention that art and morality are one is problematic.

References


