How Depictive Representations Mandate Pretence by Being Recognised in Terms of What They Depict

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Abstract. It is common knowledge within the theory of depiction that recognitional and make-believe accounts are two distinct and alternative approaches to depiction. My paper wishes to propose an alternative how we ought to think of the relationship between these two accounts. By presenting a theoretical account along Husserlian and Kantian lines, it is my hope to show that we can ground pretence in recognition of a certain kind. Thereby, we might avoid the unsatisfying allusion to automatic pretence, which Kendall Walton suggests, and instead replace it with a specific kind of anomalous recognition that can be a motivation for non-automatic and deliberate pretence. By alluding to an anomaly in the recognitional process, the account remains true to the distinct phenomenology of picture perception and is not forced to neglect the fact that recognition undergoes a certain and crucial modification when talking about representational or depictive encounters only.

It is common knowledge within the theory of depiction' that recognitional (of a Lopesian kind) and make-believe accounts (of a Waltonian kind) are two distinct and alternative approaches to understanding depiction. My paper wishes to challenge that this is the right way to conceive of the relationship of pretence and recognition. That there is, indeed, something problematic about the apparent exclusivism is reflected in two peculiar lacunae of the two theories. On the one hand, by not even considering the

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1 Cf. the classification recently given in the introduction to their volume on depiction by Abell in Bantinaki in: Abell, Catharine and Katerina Bantinaki, Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, Oxford / New York 2010: Oxford University Press.
fact that genuine recognition could play a role in picture perception, Walton assumes the existence of pretence *automatisms*. Assuming, however, automatisms of pretence seems an ad hoc attempt to save his pretence account from losing *pretence* account status when something like genuine recognition comes dangerously close to fulfilling the same role. Recognitionalists do not need this ad hoc solution. For them, recognition is the explanatory route from the very get-go. But they, on the other hand, should not neglect the fact that, even if genuine recognition does play a role in picture perception, it undergoes a certain structural modification if the recognised *thing* turns out to consist of a pictorial content only. Once we admit the latter and see the awkwardness of the former, the door is open to ally the two accounts for their own benefit. This is the aim of the paper via an attempt to show that this peculiar phenomenon could be what Walton has in mind when introducing the notion of pretence *automatisms*. Thus, it seems possible to say something substantial and phenomenological about Walton’s pretence automatism without having to refer to mechanical explanations, but by instead positing something along the lines of a recognitional type. The following suggestion hopes to do justice to the respective strength of the two accounts, while also providing yet another interpretation of Richard Wollheim’s notion of *twofoldness*.2

My paper proceeds as follows. I will first flesh out what I take to be the two above-mentioned lacunae. Then, I offer some points that any account of depiction should cover before presenting a roughly Kantian and roughly Husserlian-inspired approach as to how pictures give rise to recognition. The aim of this section is not exegetical but rather goal-oriented. I will first address how, in such a framework, empirical recognition works in general, and continue by detailing the merits that such an approach can have for theories of depiction. A crucial question will be whether this approach implies illusionism. In the last section, I will argue that it does not do so, for the reason that it leads directly to a pretence account of some sort.

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I. Recognitional and Pretence Accounts

I will not go into detail about the two accounts mentioned above since they will be familiar to the reader. Let us, however, consider at least a few points in order to understand why I think recognitionalists and pretence theorists could learn from one another, as well as fruitfully enrich their respective theories via mutual exchange.

According to Walton's pretence account, depictive contents qua intentional contents result from pretence acts. That they do so is rooted in the fact that the real object of our perceptual state – the pictorial surface, colour and paint – is not identical with that, which we ascribe as being the object of our apparently perceptual state. For Walton, indeed, whenever one says, “I see a ship”, while actually looking at a ship depiction, one isn't self-ascribing a perceptual state with any content remotely similar to a real ship at all. The only perceptual state we could rightfully self-ascribe in this case is the state in which the object is the representing object. According to Walton, we rather pretend to self-ascribe a perceptual state as if the object of said state were an actual ship. We initiate this pretence by means of the perceptual relation that we have with our perceptual state's real source.

For Walton, this enterprise resembles the way little Timmy's pretence gives rise to his father's monstrosity* in a monster game. When Timmy self-ascribes a perceptual state of something along the lines of 'seeing a monster', he certainly does not think that he is actually seeing a monster. After all, he sees his father and knows that he is seeing his father. Thus, he does not truly self-ascribe a state of 'monster-seeing', but rather pretends to self-ascribe a state of 'monster-seeing' when he is perceiving the suitable prop, namely, his father. It looks as if, if Timmy can be suitably regarded as a pretender, then so too can we whenever we perceive a depictive image. This is Walton's assumption.

There is a crucial difference, of course, between us perceiving a depictive image and Timmy's 'monster-seeing', which needs mentioning. Timmy's pretence is, namely, deliberate and devoid of a belief concomitant to the actual seeing a monster. By contrast, we really do believe when looking at a ship depiction that we are seeing a ship or at least “something shippy”. And further, this belief does not seem based on a deliberate decision on

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our parts about what it is that we are seeing in the image, which is representing a ship. To take account of this difference, Walton regards the latter acts as cases of a specific kind of pretence: of automatic pretence, which again goes along with pretence beliefs only.\(^3\) Thus, it is not that we do not pretend in cases of depictive interactions, we just pretend differently, i.e. automatically and non-deliberately.

I will not go into a detailed critique of Walton’s account due to a lack of space. For the sake of simplicity, I will just appeal to the reader’s intuition concerning one point. Pretence is something we do, i.e., it is an activity of some sort, and at least something resulting from or going along with a kind of awareness.\(^4\) Walton obviously disagrees on this point. Although I do think that Walton is mistaken, here I will only suggest that his disagreement is unfortunate. By not agreeing, Walton loses the chance to go deeper and ask: how is it that pictures can engage us in the specific activity of pretence in which we are, then, engaged? Indeed, Walton seems to assume that the apparently recognitional contents of depictions can only result from pretence, since anything else would inflate our ontology.\(^5\) However, by restricting himself to this "either/or" – i.e., either we genuinely recognise something and are forced to posit the recognised thing as real or we just pretend to recognise, even if the latter is automatic – he indeed loses a substantial notion of pretence and remains satisfied with an ad hoc introduction of automatic and quite mechanical pretence reactions.

Recognitional accounts (à la Lopes) do not require this ad hoc solution. According to such accounts, depictive contents possess a genuinely recognitional presence for us, because they allow us to have the thing, which they depict, present. Pictures are transparent\(^6\), and it for this very reason


\(^6\) For Lopes, “[d]rawing is simply applied recognition” (Lopes, *Understanding Pictures*, 186), whereas “[i]n drawing, the eye and the hand work together, perhaps bypassing the mind, or that portion of the mind that deals with concepts and beliefs" (Lopes, Under-
that we are in some genuine recognitional contact with the depicted thing when looking at its picture. Thus, for Lopes, even unmodified depictive demonstratives are possible and true.\textsuperscript{7}

A drawback of the latter approach is that the last claim is probably wrong. A further drawback is that it works for non-fictive pictures only.\textsuperscript{8} When dealing with fictive pictures, pretence comes in some form or other.\textsuperscript{9} After all, that which does not exist cannot have a genuine recognitional presence and be the cause of that, which allows for this re-presenting. Yet, if pretence accounts have to become, indeed, mechanical and automatic in order to ground the immediate and intersubjective grasp of pictorial contents, then nothing is gained. At best, we have a classificatory schema, which allows us to call those acts with an existent source as ‘recognitional’, while calling all others, ‘acts of automatic pretence’. Phenomenology does not seem to matter.

If recognitionalists need pretence accounts anyway, then little is gained by trying to avoid their implications. Thus, I think that recognitional accounts would fare better, if they endorsed the proposition that recognition plays a role in fictive depictions, as well. Albeit awkward-sounding presently, below the point will be further clarified. A crucial point that recognitionalists ought to abandon, however, is that that pictorial con-

\textit{standing Pictures}, 186). Pictures, according to Lopes, can preserve a direct recognitional relation, and this is why they are transparent.

Concerning the conservation of informational data, Lopes follows Evans who posits: “We can speak of a certain bit of information being of, or perhaps from, an object, in a sense resembling the way in which we speak of a photograph being of an object [...] The sense in which a photograph is of an object is as follows. A certain mechanism produces things which have a certain informational content [...] Thus if we are concerned with a photograph of a red ball on top of a yellow square, then the content of the photograph can be represented by the open sentence

\texttt{Red (x) & Ball (x) & Yellow (y) & Square (y) & On Top Of (xy)}.

The mechanism is a mechanism of information storage, because the properties that figure in the content of its output are [...] the properties possessed by the objects, which are the input to it”. Evans, Gareth, \textit{The Varieties of Reference}, edited by John McDowell, Oxford 1982: Clarendon Press, 124f.

\textsuperscript{7} Lopes, “Picture This: Image-based Demonstratives”, 52-80.
\textsuperscript{9} Cf. Lopes, \textit{Understanding Pictures}, chapter 10.
2. Some General Remarks

Let me begin by sketching briefly some very rough points that I take to be crucial for any theory of depiction. They will help to sketch the road we are about to travel.

(i) Any account should be able to explain the distinct phenomenology of picture perception (something like twofoldness);

(ii) A corollary of this seems to be: essentially illusionist approaches (à la Gombrich) are unsatisfactory.

(ii) Although looking at a depictive picture seems to expose a distinctive phenomenology, there does not seem to be a phenomenological difference between looking at a truly representational image and looking at a fictive picture. Thus, phenomenologically, a unitary account for both seems attractive.

(iii) If a picture deserves to be called an x-depiction, this is so because it can be taken intersubjectively to represent x.

(iv) Unless referring to a strange set of utterly complex conventions, this intersubjective “taking the content to represent x” seems to be best accounted for by endorsing a recognitional account of picture perception.\(^\text{10}\)

(v) If recognition is to account for our epistemic contact with a depiction's content and if this can, at least possibly, hold for fictive and non-fictive depictions alike, then depictive recognition cannot allow us some kind of non-conceptual de re thought of its real cause (as assumed by Lopes). Thus, an alternative is needed, which might be stated as follows: when recognising x in y, then the depictive content...
provided by y allows us to subsume it under the concept of x, whereby the x-concept can be acquired by description.\footnote{We find a similar concept of recognition in Kant's schematism chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason. Cf. Kant, Immanuel, Immanuel Kant's Critique of pure reason, edited by Norman Kemp Smith, Reprint, London 1978: Macmillan. It is crucial that Kant does not bind his concept of recognition to object-perception but rather to the key concepts of demonstration and exposition (Darstellung), an instance of which is Darstellung im Bilde whereby he assumes that imagistic and purely imagistic expositions are possible cases of recognition. If we grant that we can have concepts of purely fictional entities, this makes a Kantian-inspired concept of recognition applicable for 'suchlike' pictures, too. On the possibility of suchlike concepts, cf. Schiffer, Stephen, "Language-Created Language-Independent Entities", in: Philosophical Topics 24 / 1 (1996), 149-167.}

(vi) The assertion "This is a ship" is, strictly speaking, wrong when looking and pointing at a ship depiction, and it is wrong even if the depiction is a faithful rendering of a ship.\footnote{Cf. Schier, Flint, Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation, Cambridge / New York 1986: Cambridge University Press, 110. I cannot defend the validity of either concept here; instead, I can only point out that they are different. I thank Robert Hopkins for guiding me to the realization that work needs to be done, but this is a hint in the right direction.} Still, there is a sense in which this sentence is legitimate. It is the responsibility of a descriptive account to make clear what exactly this sense is.

The above points are nothing more than a collection of basic intuitions. Needless to say, they fall short of anything close to basic conditions for or a definition of depiction.\footnote{Cf. Lopes, [64A4?]icture This: Image-based Demonstratives[FFFDF?] 52-80.} But since it is solely my intent to make a certain approach attractive, I will leave a formalization of and argumentation for these intuitions to the side.\footnote{E.g., I have said nothing about the artist[75F4?] intentions, which seem to come in at some point as correctness conditions; I, furthermore, have said nothing about whether all pictorial properties are depictive and should be regarded as depictive. Furthermore it is clear that the above points make theoretical presuppositions, which I will not be able to defend here. One of them is that we can have contentful thoughts about (even if not really of) entities, which do not exist. Many may object to that suggestion and favour a pretence account just for this very reason. Nevertheless, they may appreciate what I say at least for non-fictional depictions.}
3. Strategies along Husserlian and Kantian Lines...

Let me now turn to some lessons we can learn from a certain reading of Husserl and Kant with regard to the above points. I ought to emphasise, however, that an exegetical account matters less, for my purposes here, than the structural profit, which I hope to achieve from the two writers. This is why I alluded above to an account that is ‘roughly inspired’ by the two thinkers. I do not wish to claim that either Kant or Husserl would be content with what I develop in the following. Yet, inspired by certain questions arising in the theory of depiction, a certain structural adaption seems highly attractive when one consults Kant and Husserl. This structural adaptation’s particular merit is that it helps us come to terms with how to think of ‘twofoldness’ and how to think of the manner in which depictive representations mandate pretence, which is indeed recognition-based.

In a way, Husserl seems to follow Kant in regarding recognitional states as essentially conceptual or, at least, as exhibiting a structure that we could regard as conceptual if a certain understanding of ‘concept’ is maintained. Husserl’s nomenclature oftentimes differs from Kant’s in that where Kant speaks of a manifold that is conceptualised, Husserl speaks of hyletic data which are apperceived according to or in terms of a certain sense

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\[16\] As Solomon observes, Husserl’s thesis “is essentially a Kantian thesis: the claim that concepts are basic not only to conceptual thought but to our most primitive perception and experience as well. Perception, like belief, judgement, and assertion, has ‘meaning’ (Sinn), not simply reference (with which meaning is often confused). All perception involves judgments [...] In Kantian terms, we would say that all our experience is concept-laden and meaning-full, that what we experience is ‘constituted’ through our judgments. The Husserlian thesis is strikingly similar to this, except that he would speak of an ‘essence’ where Kant spoke of ‘concept’. (Solomon, Robert, C., “Husserl’s Concept of the Noema”, in: *Husserl. Exposition and Appraisals*, edited by Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick, Notre Dame/London 1977: Notre Dame University Press, 168-181, 177).
they exemplify. Regardless, this formulation preserves the following general idea: objects provide us with empirical data which are structured according to the type to which the token presenting these data belongs. If we recognise an object, we do so via (passively or subconsciously) apprehending data according to their structure and by detecting what kind of rule they make us follow according to the structures, which they present to us. Coming to terms with the rule that they make us follow is tantamount to recognising the object as falling under this very concept. Concepts can thus be understood as rules, i.e. rules for synthesis.

This picture is certainly very primitive and it falls short of the complexities currently discussed under the name of temporal binding, but it can and has been fleshed out thoroughly.\(^\text{17}\) For my purposes here, it is meant to be primitive because I want to concentrate on two philosophical implications of the model. The first implication seems quite trivial. If object recognition is synthetic, it seems to be something happening in time. I will come back to this point later.

A further point we ought to regard is this: he who follows a rule (i) possibly follows one rule only\(^\text{18}\) and (ii) follows the followed rule right from the start. It may take a while until he knows what rule he follows, but he will always have been following this very rule.

This point would be unproblematic if — to continue employing my metaphorical shorthand\(^\text{19}\) — these recognitional “rules” were already individuated by, so the speak, their starting points, i.e. the very first datum we apprehend. But this seems quite improbable. To give an overly simple example: if we regard colour data as primitive, it is likely that we ought to assume that my processing this colour datum certainly does not have any implications for higher order processes and thus, primitive data are compatible with quite an array of rules and structures. Still, somehow at

\(^\text{17}\) For a reconstruction, cf. Leiber, Theodor, “Kategorien, Schemata und empirische Begriffe: Kants Beitrag zur kognitiven Psychologie”, in: \textit{Kant-Studien} 87 (1996), 1-41; a source from which I have profited greatly.

\(^\text{18}\) Leaving cases of over-determination aside.

\(^\text{19}\) Which is indeed meant to be metaphorical as I take philosophy to be unconcerned with empirical matters. As philosophers, we ought, instead, provide the framework according to which suchlike empirical matters (which are in need of interpretation anyway) can be interpreted.

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least, it must be the case that the first datum *points* to the last datum of our hypothetical process of rule following; otherwise it would not be part of the rule, which has always been followed right from the start.  

In other words: The starting point has to be compatible with an array of rules, while simultaneously having always been pointed at the rule which the synthesis, of which we are conceptually aware, has followed.

If we accept some ideas, which are in the air in both Husserl and Kant, we seem to be able to shed some light on the above issue. It hinges on there being a complex network of retentional and anticipatory (i.e. past- and forward looking) structures among synthetic processes or processed data. Of course, we are talking about subconscious structures here. This may indicate that, indeed, my suggestion is more Kantian than Husserlian, but this is of little import here. What is crucial is rather this: According to this complex network, any recognition-relevant datum which is processed (or apprehended) is not only processed *simpliciter*, but also processed in such a way that it includes certain *compatibility suggestions* with other possible data that are based on previous experience or on descriptive information; further, it is significant that, due to the latter, the account becomes applicable to a possible recognition of fictive pictures, as well.

Husserl, when referring to the macro-level of perceiving an object through an array of possible perspectives and adumbrations, calls these compatibility suggestions *empty intentions*, using a Kantian metaphor to point out that we are talking about conceptual – empty – but nonintuiting moments. I feel free to apply his metaphor to the micro-level of ob-

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20 This might be compatible with Moshe Bar’s idea that apparently hierarchical brain structures involve shortcuts from lower to higher levels that go along with certain specifications of the to-be-processed data. Cf. Bar, Moshe, “A cortical mechanism for triggering top-down facilitation in visual object recognition”, in: *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 15 (2003), 600–609.

21 After all, Husserl’s *specious present*, which will be of importance later, is neither unconscious nor the time of object recognition. But I think that Husserl has to assume an above-kind of *specious present* anyway if object recognition is indeed synthetic. Thus, I will neglect this possibly critical point. As said, he only roughly inspires my account. Thanks to Fabian Dorsch for warning me against giving more credit to Husserl than he might have liked.

22 I allude again to the point that we may not assume a notion of recognition as it is employed by Lopes (who follows Evans’ *The Varieties of Reference*), rather one we can distil from Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*. 

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ject recognition based on a synthetic manifold of hyletic data. After all, it is this level, which I base my considerations on, and it is this dimension, which seems to matter for issues of image consciousness. Apart from “empty intentions”, Husserl also uses the metaphor of expectations. This might help us to understand these empty intentions as something like an array of hypothetical rule suggestions that are there to be filled and that can possibly be filled. Some rule suggestions will in some way always already have been filled if we are aware of an object and if object consciousness is indeed synthetic.  

What is already clear from this sketch, is that most of these empty intentions end up being disappointed. The very rule comes to be asserted as the one, which we have been following all the time, which is compatible with – ideally – all these hyletically based and empty intentions that can, therefore and in turn, be integrated into this one rule only. In other words, we end up with the rule that allows us to regard the data concretely apprehended as intuitively (ful-)filling empty anticipatory intentions of this very concept.  

As it stands, this model does not only have the weakness of being primitive, but also that it could suggest that we are talking about something like a linear or hierarchical processual specification during which certain assumptions are ruled out as we proceed. This, however, would be most unfortunate. After all, object consciousness is phenomenally nothing like a becoming aware of a thing on the basis of data, but is a being aware of an object. Furthermore, if we assumed a strictly hierarchical process, this would lead to a strange consequence. Suppose, e.g., colour data were more primitive than shape data associated with type concepts and that colour data made certain compatibility assumptions in the end concerning type concepts. Suppose further that whiteness essentially points at “swan” etc. and blackness points at “raven” etc. Now, suppose Alfred has no idea that back

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33 Certainly, there must be some criterion upon which it is decided, which data play a role in the recognition of object A and which do so for object B. Husserl, as far as I know, remains quite silent on this issue, but I am confident that cognitive scientists may provide us with an answer. I will remain neutral with regarding this point.

34 This is not meant to ignore that Husserl allows for cases in which two incompatible rules remain in the game. But these cases are “uncertainties”, and they are at stake on the macro-level only.
swans exist. How could he ever see something as a black swan if his pro-
cessing of blackness did not allow for blackness going along with “swan”? One, if consistent, would have to admit the absurd consequence that he, then, could not.

To allow for suchlike cases, even if the suitable repertoire of corre-
sponding expectations is lacking, we have to acknowledge that our basic
data (presumably those responsible for getting ‘just this’ synthetic process
going) can, retrospectively, be smoothly included into a process, the speci-
ficity of which, emerges as we proceed with our synthetic activity.\(^{25}\) Thus, we just (of course, subconsciously) treat the new data as if we had antici-
pated it or even make it be anticipated.

Allow me again to borrow a fruitful idea that Husserl has developed in
another context. When trying to account for certain doxic modalisations
and when coming to deal with the question of how utterly unexpected data
come to be part of a process of unfolding adumbrations of one and the
same thing without leading to a rupture or a new sense, Husserl developed
the idea of a rückwirkende Durchstreichung, i.e. a retrospective crossing out,
which is meant to help combine the unexpected with the ‘already-there’. We
can adopt this idea (which is again designed for the macro-level) for
the micro-level and just assume that a certain retentional\(^{26}\) manipulation or
specification can take place. Retention is Husserl’s notion for a minimal
quasi-past. But maybe we should again shrink this notion and emphasise
its still belonging to the very present (and extended) moment as such. I
will indicate this specific sense by speaking of a retentional* past. What
is crucial to note, is that the new datum in our synthetic process of data
apperception can change the sense, according to which the data have been
apperceived, retrospectively. It can lead to changes within its retentional*
past by making retentional* data point at that, which the expected or un-
expected brings with it.\(^{27}\)

This tells us something about this retentional* past, as well as the struc-

\(^{25}\) Which is tantamount to saying that empirical concepts are not defined.

\(^{26}\) Or rather: under a very specific reading of what Husserl suggests in his Analysen
zur Passiven Synthesis. I feel free to adopt this idea for my framework. For the relevant
passage, cf. § 7 of his Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis.

\(^{27}\) An aside: Exploiting this adaptive recognition is certainly a crucial aspect of a lot of
art-works. Consider, as an example, Cubism.
ture of these sets of anticipations and fulfils: concerning the latter, it tells us that we are not really dealing with hierarchically structured, but *coordinated* data in which apparent higher order, or ‘later’, processes influence lower level, or ‘earlier’, processes. The lesson concerning temporal issues is the following: if this all happens within a certain time frame, and if it occurs in such a way indicating that we have always been following *this* rule (which manifests via consciousness of *this* thing\(^{28}\), then both the order and the restructuring cannot really count. They do not matter in that they do not become conscious; either as a process or as anything other than the object, which they raise into consciousness.

Let us hold onto the following: To begin, a complex structure of *synthetic* activity is not only compatible with its making an instantly present object available to consciousness, but also it is possible that this synthetic activity includes retentional* corrections that do not manifest as opinion changes. Next, if we accept these two point, then we can assume that (i) the “now present” has to be such that it comprises a certain set of synthetic processes, and (ii) such that it comprises them as not having a temporal order themselves. That is to say, the now-present seems to have a non-temporal order, which can allow for retrospective alterations and inclusions of anticipatory moments that make new data compatible with rules that so far did not leave room for suchlike data. Thus, we should assume that object consciousness is tied to a certain kind of *specious present* that allows for suchlike modifications because the hypothetical order, of the manifold it comprises (it is *specious*), is not really of a temporal kind (it is a *present*). This notion of a specious present as the present of object consciousness will be important as we proceed.

There are theoretical objections to assuming a specious present, which I cannot address here.\(^{29}\) Consider my model an invitation for following me along Husserlian and Kantian lines. One advantage of doing so is that it will help us arrive at an explanation of why such a recognitional account does not imply illusionism and can lead to a pretence account of some

\(^{28}\) Even if, to do so, a subconscious or passive retentional* or retrospective restructuring has to take place.

\(^{29}\) For a good summary, cf. Le Poidevin, Robin, *The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation*, Oxford 2009: Oxford University Press. It is noteworthy that Le Poidevin does not discuss the kind of specious present that I have sketched.
sort.

4. ... and their Implications for Depictive Pictures

What does the above have to do with pictures? The first part of my answer is hardly eccentric. Depictive pictures are assemblages of recognitional aspects, i.e. hyletic data or distal stimuli providing whoever looks at the picture with the data necessary for following the rule, which the object that the picture depicts would also require one to synthetically follow. In other words: depictive pictures of x depict by instatiating the rule that x would instantiate itself via its own recognitional aspects or data, if it were seen in such a way\(^{30}\), or if it existed in such a way.

I have not said anything about what these recognitional aspects might be. I prefer somewhat outline shapes or gestalt aspects, but it might be safer to refer simply to distal stimuli (whatever it is that they amount to in the end). Of vital importance is that these stimuli come in synthetic sets (in some sense); also, that these stimuli can be carried by two-dimensional surfaces, as well as three-dimensional objects; and, finally, that the vehicle makes no difference for the recognitional dimension as such.\(^{31}\)

This brings me to my crucial point. Even if we may agree that something recognitional is going on when we look at a depiction, we have to make room for the fact that, in most cases, we instantly know that we are merely looking at a depiction.\(^{32}\) I think Husserl and Kant can again help us here. We just have to take into account two points: First, our processing

\(^{30}\) It goes without saying that the [52AA?]ays[FFFD?]extend the manner in which ordinary objects generally present themselves; this might point to an epistemological explanation of the pleasures of looking at a picture: we enjoy our ability of coming to terms even with rather strange renderings of familiar objects.

\(^{31}\) This seems to be a fact. After all we do see or see* things in pictures.

\(^{32}\) The question of how to account for this fact has ignited debate that tends to focus on how to understand what Wollheim has called *twofoldness*. Is it, as Wollheim suggests, that we are aware of both the represented object as well as its surface aspects? This seems hardly necessary and quite difficult to explain. Are we representing two objects? Are we aware of two objects? But how? And how do the two objects relate to one another? The trouble with diverse interpretations of Wollheim’s twofoldness has led some to endorse unitary accounts by, e.g. suggesting that we come to see one object in terms of the other or that we are talking about resemblance relations (cf. Peacocke, Budd and Hopkins).
of distal stimuli results in our awareness of the rule we have followed in doing so, and this awareness is what recognition in a concept results in (this we already know from above). Second, I think that we can also assume that recognition is somehow related to a certain interest and this interest is specific in that it is primarily concerned with the *quidditas* of what we encounter. When checking whether something is a mouse, we examine whether it is mousish or maybe rattish, and maybe find out that it is, indeed, rabbitish. Our recognitional interest or concern relates to what we are dealing with. This concern might be rooted in an evolutionary interest, namely one linked with an assumption that what we encounter, consists in spatiotemporal objects anyway. From this would follow that their ontological status is of less importance than the question of whether we are dealing with a lion or a sheep. In any case, ontological considerations do not really seem to be at stake at this level, despite retaining some importance. If, however, they matter on a different level, they might be related to different kinds of anticipations. The disappointment of such anticipations does not give rise to the recognition of a different object, but to a *different kind of recognition*.

When we perceive a thing as a rabbit, we have certain anticipations going along with our acceptance that it is indeed a rabbit. If the thing disappoints these anticipations, we either come to see the object as something different or we change our concept of a rabbit accordingly. Perhaps the former anticipations were just too narrow, excluding cases that should have been included. In any case, we check whether rabbit-specific aspects are there or not. And we do so by expecting something rabbit-specific of that item. There is a certain anticipation implicit to this game that is, however, far less specific. Indeed, this anticipation goes along with not just rabbits but rather with any object we perceive, be it mice, chickens or lampshades; it is the anticipation, regardless of what x comes to be in the end, that it is a spatiotemporal thing. If we change our opinion that this item deserves to be called a rabbit and rather see it as a mouse, the latter anticipation is not disappointed. As a spatiotemporal object, the mouse still unfolds in perspectives, it still fits into our spatiotemporal horizon and it still allows us some kind of interaction, e. g., kinaesthetic interaction.

If I recognise something as being a potential object of a certain kind, then I do not only have certain expectations concerning its quidditas,
but also have certain trans-perspectival, spatial and objectual expectations that the object will develop as a proper object should. If we want to assume that there really are these trans-perspectival expectations, then they have to be based on a very limited and, if you wish, on a purely-perspectival content. Otherwise, it would be strange to speak of expectations. Thus, it must be a three-dimension-wise and rather poor perspectival content, which gives rise to these expectations. Still, if these expectations are being built on the basis of such a content, then this content seems to be grasped in terms of its being the content that presents an object. We are aware of an object and not of a perspective. Thus, these expectations belong intricately to the limited and purely-perspectival content. They are somehow presupposed as being fulfilled (and perhaps as more, as will be discussed below).

We often change our opinion about the things we see. We correct our perceptual judgements. My suggestion above was that these corrections can happen on a micro-level, too, and that they might even happen all the time without our noticing it. Perhaps they are only implicit in the recognitional process. It is a relatively rare occurrence that we have to correct our real-object-specific anticipations. Nonetheless, this can happen and, indeed, does happen if ‘something’ presents itself as a proto-object that gives rise to specific anticipations, which this proto-thing then disappoints. Thus, it can be the case that an apparent something fails to be some thing.

This brings me to image consciousness. How is recognition involved in pretence? The first ingredient to the idea is that recognition is, indeed, somehow independent of a thing’s (not) being a spatiotemporal object. Recognition happens already on a perspectival level and runs tandem with a two-tier expectation concerning, first, what the thing is, and second, its being a thing properly speaking. The latter set of expectations consists of, as suggested, e. g., the expectation that the thing presents itself in different perspectives as I move around it and, most basically, that it is in space in such a way that it allows me to perceive it spatially. The second ingredient is that depictive pictures generally disappoint recognition-based expectations of the second kind. Images of objects fail to be objects themselves.

Following Husserl again, we may assume that images go along with a
specific kind of consciousness, i.e., image consciousness. This image consciousness results from a certain conflict (Widerstreit), which is based on something recognitional that is going on. It makes sense to assume that it is exactly the conflict resulting from data, which indicates that there is, in fact, an x (i.e., data provided by the surface of the depiction), and data, which indicate the non-'self-givenness' of the spatiotemporal object.

If we assume this sort of image consciousness, we can assume the following: while we successfully recognise a ship in a picture, in so far as it provides us with data leading to a synthesis according to a ship rule, it is our most basic spatiotemporal expectations which are systematically disappointed, due to the very structure depictions tend to have. That, which allows x to be seen in terms of a ship, does not permit us to integrate it as a ship into our space-time. Nor does it allow us to act upon it.


Three-dimensional representations, of course, demand a modified account.

Cf. recent accounts endorsing a difference between dorsal and ventral pathways, e.g., Nanay, Bence, “Inflected and Uninflected Perception of Pictures”, in: Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction, edited by Catherine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki 2010: Oxford University Press, 181-207, as well as Lopes, Dominic, “Picture This: Image-based Demonstratives”, ibid., Oxford, 52-80. Brown gives a useful list comprising some of the perceptual differences between looking at a picture and looking at a thing: “(D1) Visual experience, binocular or monocular, of pictorial subjects lacks the selective clarity and blur that depends on the accommodation of the eye to distance. (D2) It also lacks the stereoscopic accommodation for distance and therefore any double-imaging of objects viewed out of focus. (D3) no parallax occurs within depicted scenes with change of the viewer’s position: no seeing around objects or sliding of near objects in front of far ones as we move. (D4) From non-optimal points of view the subject seems to deform in response to changes of the stimulus. This is especially noticeable in architectural pictures and in large pictures with space-marking motifs (orthogonals, diagonals, etc.) Perceptual constancy is then no match for the power of the stimulus. Far from random, the deformations obey strict principles of ‘invariance’ (...) (D5) As a result of the foregoing, pictorial space is presented as discontinuous with the viewer’s ecological space and is perceived as such whenever the viewer moves about in the normal area of viewing. (D6) Visual experience when viewing pictures lacks the reduced acuity of perception of things far in the distance, compared with nearer things. (D7) Picture-viewing yields reduced illumination compared with face-to-face viewing of counterparts” (Brown, John H., “Seeing Things in Pictures”,

while seeing it as a ship, we are still unable to perceive and comprehend it in terms of all that a ship actually constitutes.

There is some strange recognitional success involved in image consciousness. Ship pictures are legitimately seen in terms of a ship and not of, say, a mouse. They really do present us with data instantiating the ship rule. But there is still a very specific kind of recognition failure involved. Remember, *this* is not really a ship. As previously stated, however, we usually are not deceived by images and the disappointment of our most basic anticipations does not go by unnoticed. Instead, it is noticed as a certain anomaly of our recognitional process. Noticing this anomaly of our recognitional process is being image conscious and being image conscious changes the way in which we think of the “ship”. Indeed, we think of no ship at all, but rather of a non-object-ship. We just think of the image of a ship, i. e., a ship*.

5. Essential Illusionism?

Illusionism might still be hanging in the air. After all, does this approach not imply that we first see the ship picture in terms of an actual ship, only to realise post hoc that the represented object fails to be a proper object-ship, which brings us, then, to see it as a ship* only? I do not think so. We just have to assume that the specious present described earlier is “big” enough to encompass two factors. First, it must encompass the prosen-sual stages resulting in some purely perspectival x-consciousness that gives rise to further trans-perspectival anticipations. Second, it must encompass these trans-perspectival expectations as well as their fulfilment or, in the case of image consciousness, their disappointment. Only if we assume this, can we really say that we are instantly aware of objects whenever we seem to be instantly aware of objects. Thus, it seems attractive to assume

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36 This awareness, of course, implies having a concept of an image. I assume, however, that this concept is simply the concept of this very conflict.

that the synthetic unity of which we are instantly aware (if we are aware of something) does not only encompass data resulting in the awareness of one's seeing an object from this perspective, but also data indicating that we are, indeed, seeing an object or a non-object of “this perspectival appearance” only.

We might wish to say, when looking at a picture, that the synthetic process starts as if we were following the rule of said object, which must be presupposed in the recognising of some thing. Since, however, that pictorial content, which is a non-thing, disappoints a set of expectations, which must be affirmed if it is to be an object proper, our rule becomes modified intrinsically and retentionally, and does so within the specious present itself. Thus, despite subsuming the given data under the concept of a ship, we modify our belief according to the disappointment. Instead of having the belief of seeing a ship-object or a spatiotemporal objectual ship, we have the belief to be looking at something which merely appears 'shiply'. We have a modified object-belief and an unmodified image-belief.

If we accept that this modification can be of the kind that I have sketched above, then it is assumable that one could both recognise pictorial contents while still being instantly image conscious. Image consciousness is modified object consciousness. We can now even think of images as being something like modifications of the object-rules. But this issue would require detailed examination in a follow-up paper.

Let me finally tackle the question of how depictions can be considered to mandate pretence in such a framework. The answer goes as follows: A full theoretical explication of the content, of which we are conscious when looking at a depictive image, has to cover not only what we recognise (i.e., a ship) but also the fact that it is anomalously recognised. When saying that we recognise or see x simpliciter, this anomaly is lost in the explication. In order to avoid losing it, we have to acknowledge and express that recognition is modified. The difficulty lies therein that we do not have special verbs for modified-recognition, modified-seeing and modified-hearing. When wishing to express that a recognitional or perceptual process is modified, we can only use those verbs at our disposal. But we can and do use them differently, e.g., connivingly.\(^\text{37}\) We can say,
“I see a ship”, and mean simultaneously that we are not seeing an actual ship. This seems to be something we do when being image conscious. I suppose that this phenomenon is what Walton has in mind when asserting that pretence is automatic.

There is some truth in Walton’s observation. Walton, though, does not acknowledge the possibility that recognition is involved. My framework tells a different story. Indeed, pretence can be grounded in and motivated by recognition. Pretence is grounded in recognition if recognition is anomalous and if we are conscious of the anomaly.

Pretence is not solely something automatic. Rather, it is motivated by a certain awareness; there is always something deliberate about it. The ‘deliberate’ aspect in the above-sketched scenario is that we typically decide to speak of the appearing item as if it were a proper object. We decide to speak in shorthand and say, “This is a ship”, or, “I see a ship”. We pretend to treat it as an object, even though we know that it is a non-object, properly speaking. Further, we pretend to recognise it simpliciter, although we actually recognise it anomalously. It must be noted that this kind of pretence is related to how we speak of the ship* and our perceptual state, while not being related to our epistemic or perceptual state as such.

My suggestion does not only spare us the assumption of automatic pretence, but also preserves our initial assumption that depiction-referring demonstratives (e. g., “This is a ship”) are, strictly speaking, wrong, even if they have some legitimacy. Their legitimacy is not of a Lopesian kind, i.e. related to an apparent informational transparency and full-fledged recognition of the thing itself. Rather, it is the legitimacy of there truly being something that provides us with the data, which, in turn, allows a specific synthesis according to a rule. But since this kind of data only allows for modified object recognition, our demonstrative, “This is a ship”, remains in need of further qualification.

6. Conclusion

An approach to picture recognition and image consciousness along Husserlian and Kantian lines, as I have sketched above, can flesh out Walton’s notion of automatic pretence in recognitional terms. If we accept a certain concept of (conceptual) recognition, this recognition-based pretence
account ought to work for fictive and non-fictive pictures alike. The approach suggests a unified interpretation of Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness, translating it as: thinking of something that allows us to recognise it in terms of an x-rule, while not permitting us to take it as a full instance of that x-rule since it violates the general rule of objectivity as such. Such an approach is compatible with recent suggestions from cognitive scientists referring to two functional pathways (dorsal and ventral) involved in object recognition. Thus, it might be attractive as a philosophical sketch and be of interest to those engaged in scientific dialogues. Furthermore, it can be a basis for inquiring deeper into the shift of attention to pictorial properties – we wonder, e.g., what exactly it was in the picture that gave rise to our peculiar state. Also, it could offer aid in understanding the pleasures we derive from looking at complex renderings of familiar objects; perhaps we come to appreciate reflectively our highly adaptive recognitional capacity. Most importantly, however, this approach suggests that it is not only empirical explanations, which are of use in this field, but also phenomenological considerations.

References


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*How Depictive Representations Mandate Pretence*


— *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts,*
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